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Abstract
A firewall is a hardware or software device that performs inspection on a given
incoming/outgoing packets and decide whether to allow/deny the packet from
entering/leaving the system. Firewall filters the packets by using a set of rules called
firewall policies. The policies define what type of packets should be allowed or
discarded. These policies describe the field values that the packet header must
contain in order to match a policy in the firewall. The decision for any given packet
is made by finding the first matching firewall policy, if any.

In a traditional firewall, the packet filter goes through each and every policy in the
list until a matching rule is found, the same process is again repeated for every
packet that enters the firewall. The sequential lookup that the firewall uses to find the
matching rule is time consuming and the total time it takes to perform the lookup
increases as the policy in the list increases. Nowadays, a typical enterprise based
firewall will have 1000+ firewall policy in it, which is normal.

A major threat to network firewalls is specially crafted malicious packets that target
the bottom rules of the firewall’s entire set of filtering rules. This attack’s main
objective is to overload the firewall by processing a flood of network traffic that is
matched against almost all the filtering rules before it gets rejected by a bottom rule.
As a consequence of this malicious flooding network traffic, the firewall
performance will decrease and the processing time of network traffic may increase
significantly

The current research work is based on the observation that an alternative method for
the firewall policies can provide a faster lookup and hence a better filtering
performance. The method proposed in this research relies on a basic fact that the
policy can be represented as a simple Boolean expression. Thus, Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDDs), are used as a basis for the representation of access list in this
study.

viii
The contribution of this research work is a proposed method for representing firewall
policies using BDDs to improve the performance of packet filtering. The proposed
mechanism is called Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram (SS-BDD), and is
based on restructuring of the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) by using byte-wise
data structure instead of using Field-wise data structure. Real world traffic is used
during the simulation phase to prove the performance of packet filtering. The
numerical results obtained by the simulation shows that the proposed technique
improves the performance for packet filtering significantly on medium to long access
lists. Furthermore, using BDDs for representing the firewall policies provides other
useful characteristics that makes this a beneficial approach to in real world.

Keywords: Firewall, Packet Filter, Binary Decision Diagram, Early Rejection,
Packet Matching.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

الرفض المب ّكر لطرود البيانات باستخدام رسم القرار الثنائي
الملخص

الجدار الناري هو جهاز أو برنامج يقوم بفحص طرود البيانات الواردة والخارجة ،ثم يقرر إما
السماح لها أو منعها من العبور .ير ّ
شح الجدار الناري طرود البيانات باستخدام قواعد تسمى
سياسات الجدار الناري .تصف هذه السياسات قيم الحقول في بادئة طرد البيانات التي تماثل
السياسة ،ويتخذ الجدار الناري القرار بنا ًء على أول سياسة متطابقة.
ف ي الجدر النارية التقليدية ،يمر طرد البيانات على كل السياسات ،واحدة تلو األخرى حتى
يصادف وجود سياسة مطابقة .تتكرر هذه العملية لكل الطرود بال استثناء .ويعتبر البحث
المتسلسل عن سياسة متطابقة مستهلكا ً للوقت ،كما أن الوقت الالزم للمطابقة يزداد طردا ً بالنسبة
لعدد السياسات المضبوطة .وتحتوي الجدر النارية على أكثر من ألف سياسة مضبوطة في هذه
األيام.
تشكل بعض الطرود خطرا ً على الجدر النارية ،حيث تستهدف هذه الطرود الخبيثة آخر سياسة
مضبوطة لكي ترهق الجدار الناري ،في حين يعالج الجدار الناري هذه الطرود ويحاول
ّ
فيض من هذه
وإن إرسال
مطابقتها مع كل السياسات المضبوطة حتى يصل إلى آخرها.
ٍ
الطرود الخبيثة يؤدي إلى نقص في أداء الجدار الناري وزيادة ملحوظة في وقت المعالجة.
ّ
إن البحث الحالي مبني على مالحظة أن استخدام طرق أسرع للبحث سوف يؤدي إلى أداء
أفضل ،وهو مبني أيضا ً على حقيقة أن السياسات يمكن تمثيلها كتعبيرات منطقية Boolean
expressions.وبناء على ذلك ،تم استخدام رسم القرار الثنائي  BDDفي هذه الدراسة.
ويتجلّى اإلسهام في هذا العمل عبر طريقة مقترحة لتمثيل سياسات الجدار الناري باستخدام رسم
القرار الثنائي  BDDلتحسين أداء ترشيح طرود البيانات .وتس ّمى الطريقة المقدمة رسم القرار
الثنائي ال ُمخلّط بسكون SS-BDD.وتستخدم هذه الطريقة إعادة ترتيب رسم القرار الثنائي
باستخدام تكوين بيانات مبني على البايت  byteبدالً من الحقل .وقد تم استخدام طرود بيانات
حقيقية في المحاكاة إلثبات فعالية الطريقة ،كما أن القياسات المستخرجة تظهر أن هذه الطريقة
تحسن األداء بشكل ملحوظ في السياسات متوسطة الطول والطويلة.

x

مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :الجدار الناري ،ترشيح طرود البيانات ،رسم القرار الثنائي ،الرفض
المب ّكر ،مطابقة طرود البيانات.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Internet has come a long way since its inception, the accomplishment in terms of
data accessibility and availability has been growing exponentially over the couple of
decades (Cheswick, 2003). Today every other business is now reorganizing itself to
utilize the power of the Internet to connect to its users. The type of services and
application available on the Internet have become more powerful – starting from a
simple static webpage in the 1990s to online banking, shopping. The fact of
increasing number of users using the Internet implies an increasing number of
malicious attacks, which means that systems and their networks require protection
from unintentional incidents as well as malicious acts (Nikolaidis, 2000).

The increasing complexity of the Internet makes the solution of computer network
security more complex, which is why organization does not use just one solution
instead they apply layers of security to protect themselves. The best way of ensuring
security is by using a network firewall. A firewall is a computer, router, or other
communication device that filters access to the protected network (Nikolaidis, 2000).
Cheswick and Bellovin (Cheswick, 2003) (Ballew, 1997) define a firewall as a
collection of components or a system that is placed between two networks and
possesses the following properties:


All traffic from inside to outside, and vice-versa, must pass through it.



Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, is allowed to
pass through it.



The firewall itself is immune to penetration.
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Firewalling is the easiest method of all used by the network administrator to control
the access between networks (Ballew, 1997). The idea to use firewall to protect the
network, is that controlling access to the network and its resources by protecting each
host is difficult and does not scale (Oppliger, 1998). Firewall solves this issue by
creating a single connection point for multiple network and providing a single
security checkpoint. This single checkpoint will have a security policy that defines
what type of connection is allowed or rejected. It can be assumed that the firewall
itself is immune to penetration.

One of the main criticism of firewalls is that they often create bottlenecks
(Nikolaidis, 2000). The reason of this bottleneck is mainly how the firewall policies
are constructed. If the policies are not constructed properly then it may cause loss of
network performance. This motivates the need for faster firewall technologies,
keeping in mind that there is a tradeoff between performance and security.

1.2 Firewall Basic Approaches
Firewall is usually installed at the edge of the network where the private or the
Intranet connects to the public network, making it easier for the firewall to monitor
all the traffic at once. Although firewall may also be placed between departmental
networks within a company. The level of security and behavior exhibited by the
firewall depends on the type of firewall used but for this research is focused on the
Packet Filter Firewall. There are three basic approaches that a firewall uses to protect
the network: packet filtering, circuit level firewall, and application level firewall
(Cheswick, 2003)
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1.2.1 Circuit level firewall
Circuit level firewall is a type of firewall that works at the session layer of the OSI
model, between the application layer and the transport layer of the TCP/IP stack.
They monitor the handshaking between two systems and decided whether a request
session is legitimate or not. It filters the packet, by relying on the data contained in
the packet headers for the TCP session-layer protocol. These type of firewalls
usually operates two layers higher than a packet-filtering firewall does. It determines
if the requested session is legitimate or not by checking the SYN flags, ACK flags,
and the sequence numbers are involved in the TCP handshaking or not. The issue
with circuit-level proxy is that it has no understanding of the application protocols
they support. They cannot scan application data for dangerous commands or
executable contents.

1.2.2 Application-level firewall
Application-level proxy operates at the application layer of the firewall. An
application-level runs a proxy server for each application that it supports. The proxy
request on behalf of the user to the destination host. Proxy server has some
understanding of the application it is supporting and can be configured to reject
malicious content packets. Application level firewall are not easy to scale.

1.2.3 Packet filtering firewall
Packet filtering firewall operates at the network layer and is the simplest type of
firewall. Since, the firewall operates at the network layer so it has no idea of the
content of the packets like the other type of firewall mentioned above. The packet
filtering firewall works on the concept of policies. The policies use the information –
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source port, destination port, source ip, destination ip, and protocol – to filter
malicious traffic from the network.

Security is provided by comparing the packets against the list of the firewall rules
and deciding whether to allow or deny the packets based on the action defined in the
matched rule. Packet filtering firewall is widely used as a first line of defense in any
enterprise. There are numerous reason for it (Cheswick, 2003) (Oppliger, 1998)


Faster than other firewall technologies



It is a low-cost technology. Many commercial routers have the packet
filtering capabilities in it. There is various free open-source packet filtering
firewall available.



It is normally transparent to applications and users.

1.3 Firewall Policy
The packet filter firewall is usually specified by a set of rules. The rules are a simple
if-then-else structure with each rule defining the action that should be taken, if any
packet matches. A set of rules in the firewall is known as access control list, policy
list or rules (Ballew, 1997). The firewall traverses the rules sequentially to find the
matching rule for any given packet.

Defining the firewall policy is simple for any user but it has its own disadvantages if
they are not defined properly. The order of how the rules are inserted and represented
in the firewall is of high importance which can affect the overall performance of the
firewall. For this reason, the packet filtering implementation represents the list of
policies in the firewall in a linear fashion. The decision making process called lookup
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goes through each rule one at a time in a linear fashion and decided whether the
packet should be accepted or rejected until a matching rule is found. The time taken
to perform the lookup is clearly proportional to the number of rules in the firewall.

1.4 Problem Statement
The main aim of this research is to propose a new representation technique called
Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram or SSBDD for the access list of the
firewall. The reason to propose a new representation technique is because the
firewall rules are consulted more frequently and they are modified less frequently.
There are many representation techniques for the firewall policies which are
discussed briefly in the Related Work Section but for this research, Binary Decision
Diagram or BDD is chosen as the base for the representation of the access list.
SSBDD is a modified version of the regular BDD. Using BDD as the representation
technique has its own advantages such as: 

Each of the rule in the firewall is simply a logical expression that is based on
the values in the rule. If any packet satisfies the condition in the rule, then the
packet is either accepted or rejected based on the action in the rule.



The entire firewall access list is represented as a single Boolean expression
that describes (Gupta, 2001) (Trabelsi, 2014) what condition each packet
must meet. BDD is a very well-known data structure for storing and
manipulating Boolean expressions compactly and efficiently.

This research addresses the following question:
How to perform an early packet rejection using Binary Decision Diagram as its data
structure?
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Chapter 2: Related Work
Packet filtering consists into performing a sequential lookup for each network packet
against the rule list until a matching rule is found. Due to the sequential lookup
nature of the firewall, the performance of the firewall will degrade over the time if
the size of the rule list of the firewall increases. Different approaches have been
proposed to improve firewall performance, using mainly, specialized data structure
(Srinivasan, 1999) or heuristics solutions (Gupta, 2001).
The idea of firewall optimization using data mining is discussed in (Trabelsi, 2014).
The proposed technique uses classifier for packet filtering. At first, the technique
tries to get the matching classifiers. If it is unable to get any classifier, then it will use
the firewalls sequential lookup to find the matching rule.
Another approach is discussed in (Boutaba, 2009), which uses BDD to generate a
relaxed version of the firewall rules that can be evaluated more quickly. After
processing a packet, the proposed technique will conclude to one of the three
following options: accept, reject, or more filtering is required. In case of more
filtering, the original policy will be used to look for a matching rule in the list, if any.
In (Zeidan, 2012), Splay Tree based technique (Statistical Splay Filtering with
Binary Search on Prefix Length) is used to improve the firewall performance. The
optimization technique allowed the firewall to perform an early packet rejection
through multilevel filtering process including field and intersection filtering modules.
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Chapter 3: Using Binary Decision Diagram for Packet Filtering
The original idea of BDD packet filter was developed by (Hazelhurst, 1998) (Bryant,
1992). BDD provides a powerful and flexible way to represent the policies of the
firewall. Each policy of the firewall can be represented using BDD via a simple
Boolean expression. Boolean expression is simply consisting of a number of
predicates, where each predicate shows what path to follow in the BDD.
Since, in BDD each policy of the firewall is represented as a Boolean expression and
as the number of policy increases the size of the BDD will increase as well.
However, BDDs are well-known for its compact representation of Boolean
expression. So using BDD as a packet filtering approach can provide an advantage in
terms of performance, which is the most important factor for any firewall. This
chapter is devoted to describing the BDD approach to packet filtering in detail.
3.1 Binary Decision Diagram
Binary Decision Diagram represent Boolean functions as rooted, directed acyclic
graphs (Bryant, 1992). In a non-technical term, a BDD can look like a decision tree,
as shown in Figure. 1. Each non-terminal node in a BDD represents a value to a
particular variable, and each non-terminal node has two children representing the
possible value for the non-terminal node (0 or 1). The dashed edge corresponds to
the case where the variable is assigned 0 and the solid edge corresponds to the case
where the variable is assigned 1. A BDD has two terminal nodes which are Boolean
constants and has a value of 0 and 1.
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Figure 1: Binary Decision Diagram
3.2 Ordering and Reducing
The issue with BDD representation is, as the number of policy increases in the
firewall the size of the BDD also increases as it will increase the Boolean
expressions. To overcome this problem, (Bryant, 1992) introduced the concept of
reduced, ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) that potentially provide a
much more compact representation for many Boolean expressions. ROBDDs are
basically a compact version of a BDDs due to the following restrictions on it
(Bryant, 1992).


The variables of a ROBDD must obey a total ordering, so that for any vertex
labelled u and any of its children labelled v, u appears before v along any path
from the root of the graph to a leaf.



A ROBDD may not contain duplicate terminals. This leaves a ROBDD with
a two terminal vertices (one labelled 0 and the other labelled 1).



A ROBDD may not contain duplicate non-terminals. Duplicate non-terminals
are those that represent the same variable where the corresponding branches
lead to the same place.
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A ROBDD may not contain redundant tests. If, at a particular vertex in the
graph, both possible values lead to the same place, then this test is
unnecessary.

These restrictions result in ROBDDs possessing some useful properties. Firstly, they
provide compact representations of Boolean functions. Although in the worst case,
their graph size can be exponentials in the number of variables, many non-trivial
Boolean functions have a polynomial size ROBDD (Bryant, 1992). Since ROBDDs
offers so many advantages over unrestricted BDDs, most applications that use BDDs
actually use ROBDDs, so it is very common to simple refer ROBDDs as BDDs
(Andersen, 1997).

3.3 The Variable Ordering Effect
The variable ordering chosen for a BDD has a strong impact on its shape and size
(Bryant, 1992). If the variable order is not chosen correctly, then it can make the
BDD for the same Boolean function from a linearly sized to an exponentially sized
BDD as show in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Two BDDs for the function x1y1 V x2y2 V ... V xnyn for n=3
For a function that cannot be represented in a compact format, it is best to choose an
optimal variable ordering for it. However, finding an optimal variable ordering for a
BDD is a NP-complete problem (Bollig, 1996). As a result, variable order are often
chosen manually or using some heuristics.

3.4 Binary Decision Diagram Packet Filter
In a BDD as a packet filter, a BDD is used to represent the firewall’s entire policy
list, and the same BDD is then used to perform lookup on the incoming packets. The
representation of the BDD is stored in the memory and whenever a new policy is
added to the list the BDD is then regenerated again. The BDD is a representation of
the Boolean expression that describes exactly what packets must be accepted or
rejected. In simple words, all paths through the BDD that lead to the terminal
labelled 1 represent the types of packets that are accepted, and the opposite is true for
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all paths leading to the terminal labelled 0. Each node or variable in the BDD refers
to a specific bit in the packet header.

3.4.1 Boolean Variables
To represent a firewall policy as a BDD it is important to know what variable in the
BDD refers to which field in the packet header, as each variable in the BDD
corresponds to a specific bit in the packet header itself. A BDD’s Boolean expression
will consist of multiple variable; in a normal case each policy is represented by at
least 104 Boolean variables. Below is the table that describes the variable naming
that will be used throughout this work.

Header Field

Boolean Variables

Source IP address
Destination IP address
Protocol type
Source port
Destination Port
Total

s_ip1 ... s_ip32
d_ip1 … d_ip32
p1 … p8
s_p1 … s_p16
d_p1 … d_p16

Total
Number
32
32
8
16
16
104

Table 1: The Boolean variable required for BDD representation

3.5 Example of Firewall Policy list conversion
The example below demonstrates how a firewall policy list can be converted into a
Boolean expression. The policy list to be used for the conversion process is shown in
the Table 2. This BDD has its protocol variables ordered first, followed by the
variables corresponding to destination information, followed by the variables
corresponding to the source information. The default policy of the firewall is to deny
all packets.

Rule Proto

Source IP

Source
Port

Destination Destination
IP
Port

Action
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1
TCP
172.21.1.89
2
TCP
172.25.12.1
Default Policy.

9070
7788

10.2.12.98
81.23.1.87

80
443

Permit
Permit

Table 2: Sample Firewall Policy List
Step 1: Defining the Boolean Variables
The following 5 fields - source address, destination address, source port, destination
port, and protocol – are used by the packet filter on the incoming packets. By
summing up all the field sizes of the header gives a total of 104 bits, so a total of 104
variables are required to represent the BDD of this access list. The variable naming
to be used for the BDD representation is shown in Table 1.
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Step 2: Converting Individual Rules
This step involves in converting the give policy into a Boolean expression. This is
accomplished by forming a conjunction of each predicate. Let Ri denote the Boolean
representation of Rule I. To convert the first rule:

Let p = Protocol = TCP
= p8’ p7’ p6’ p5’ p4’ p3 p2 p1’
Let s_p = Source Port = 9070
= s_p16’ s_p15’ s_p14 s_p13’ s_p12’ s_p11’ s_p10 s_p9 s_p8’ s_p7 s_p6
s_p5’ s_p4
s_p3 s_p2 s_p1’
Let d_p = Destination Port = 80
= d_p16’ d_p15’ d_p14’ d_p13’ d_p12’ d_p11’ d_p10’ d_p9’ d_p8’ d_p7
d_p6’ d_p5 d_p4’ d_p3’ d_p2’ d_p1’
Let s_ip = Source IP = 172.21.1.89
= s_ip32 s_ip31’ s_ip30 s_ip29’ s_ip28 s_ip27 s_ip26’ s_ip25’ s_ip24’
s_ip23’ s_ip22’
s_ip21 s_ip20’ s_ip19 s_ip18’ s_ip17 s_ip16’ s_ip15’ s_ip14’
s_ip13’ s_ip12’ s_ip11’
s_ip10’ s_ip9 s_ip8’ s_ip7 s_ip6’ s_ip5 s_ip4 s_ip3’
s_ip2’ s_ip1
Let d_ip = Destination IP = 10.2.12.98
= d_ip32’ d_ip31’ d_ip30’ d_ip29’ d_ip28 d_ip27’ d_ip26 d_ip25’ d_ip24’
d_ip23’
d_ip22’ d_ip21’ d_ip20’ d_ip19’ d_ip18 d_ip17’ d_ip16’ d_ip15’
d_ip14’ d_ip13’
d_ip12 d_ip11 d_ip10’ d_ip9’ d_ip8’ d_ip7 d_ip6 d_ip5’
d_ip4’ d_ip3’ d_ip2 d_ip1’
Then R1 = p  s_p  d_p  s_ip  d_ip
The expression is constructed similarly for the other rules.
Step 3: Combining all the rules
Using the steps shown above the expression can be generated for all the rules in the
same way and once it is done, the next step is generating a single expression for all
the rules. The expression is generated as follows:
Final expression = (R1  R2)
The final expression says that the incoming packets are either accepted by Rule R1
or Rule R2.
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3.6 Performing a Lookup
In a linear or classic BDD, once generated, performing a lookup on the given
incoming packet is simply a comparison. The comparison starts from the top node or
root node of the BDD and continues till it reaches a terminal node either 0 or 1. In
case if it reaches terminal node 0, then the given packet is rejected. However, if it
reaches the terminal node 1, then the given packet is accepted.
Figure 3 shows how a regular BDD performs a lookup upon receiving an incoming
packet. In this paper, this search will be referred as Field-wise search since it checks
one entire field at a time.

Figure 3: BDD Lookup
3.7 Issues Field-wise lookup
Field-wise lookup gives acceptable performance when the ratio of the accepted traffic
is higher than the ratio of the rejected traffic. But, if the ratio of accepted traffic is
very less, compared to the rejected traffic’s ratio, the field-wise search performance
will degrade. This is because in attacks, like DoS, the traffic usually gets rejected at
the bottom rules of the firewall.
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To understand the issues of field-wise BDD lookup, let’s take an example of two
filtering rules with a protocol field, as shown in Table 3, whose BDD is shown in
Figure 4.

Protocol
TCP
ICMP

Decimal
6
1

Binary
0110 0000
1000 0000

Table 3: Rules

P1

P2

P2

P3

1

P4

P5

P8

P7

P6

Figure 4: BDD Tree of Table 3
Considering DoS – it mainly targets the firewall by sending malicious traffic
targeting the bottom rules of the firewall – the higher the rejection ratio the more
likely the BDD performance is going to degrade. This is due to the fact, the entire
BDD will be traversed to reach the final decision.

The issue of the Field-wise lookup can be solved by simply shuffling the field-order.
For example, instead of checking the IP fields of the packet, it’s much better to check
the protocol field of the incoming packets. As the field-size is of 8-bit, and a high
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amount of packet rejection occurs at this field. This solution won’t help the firewall
to maintain it’s performance for a long period. The traffic received by the firewall
are random in nature, so relying on one field for early rejection won’t work.

The solution is interesting but in-order to maintain the performance, the firewall
needs more information, but not about the firewall rules, it needs information about
the traffic. The traffic always gives you more information about why and how the
firewall is not performing well. The type of characteristics that can help the BDD to
perform well, are the high rejection nodes. Rejection nodes are the nodes in the
firewall, that keeps track of all the nodes in the BDD tree that has the highest number
of rejection. This rejection could be either due incoming packet not matching any
specific field in the firewall or incoming packet not matching any rules at all in the
firewall.
In a linear-based BDD, the rejection nodes won’t be of much use, as the BDD is
generated only once, the regeneration only happens when a new rule is either added
or deleted from the firewall. To overcome this problem, two new approach is
proposed and explained in detail in the following section. The approach is basically
based on using the traffic characteristics of the firewall and then generating a new
BDD from time-to-time.
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Chapter 4: Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram (SSBDD)
In this chapter a new method is proposed and it is called Static Shuffling Binary
Decision Diagram or SSBDD. SSBDD is an improvement over a regular Binary
Decision Diagram Packet Filter. The proposed method improves the performance of
the firewall specially when the traffic it is receiving has a high rate of rejection
packets. SSBDD uses the BDD as its base.

It also adds two more properties on top of regular BDD to improve the performance;
the Field Ordering and the Split size as shown in Figure 5, both of them will be
discussed extensively in the coming chapters. Together with these two properties an
efficient and optimized BDD is generated. The name Static Shuffling comes from the
idea of the way it generates and parse the packet headers; instead of following the
traditional way of reading the entire field, it reads n bits from each field. One of the
advantage of this method, it is not affected by the dependency of rules in the firewall
because it relies on traffic log instead of rule analysis
There have been various studies conducted on the improvement of the firewall’s
packet filter. Most of the research focused on the rule analysis of the firewall or
rejection traffic of the firewall. In our case, SSBDD is focused on rejection traffic
because in any BDD, the acceptance traffic will always traverse the entire BDD,
which is not the case in rejection traffic.
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Binary Decision
Diagram

Field ordering

Split size

Figure 5: SSBDD Architecture
4.1 Split Size
Split size in the context of BDD defines how many bits the BDD should traverse in
each field before moving on to the next field. In the previous chapter, the importance
of the traffic characteristics was discussed. For e.g. the Protocol Distribution section
showed that checking 4 bits of protocol field will give the result more quickly than
checking the 8 bits of the field. Split size property is defined at the beginning of the
BDD generation. It is not only used at the parsing phase but it also used during the
policy representation phase of the BDD. The use of the split size in the two different
context of BDD is explained in the coming sections. The only downside of the split
size, is it cannot be an odd number and the value cannot be more than 8, this is not
due to a performance issue but it is merely due to programming limitations.

The idea of split size is not the first time it is used in firewall packet filtering; the
same technique is described (Boutaba, 2009). There’s no need for the BDD packet
filter to go through an entire field before moving on the next field. Separating them
into a non-contiguous block can be useful too. For example, the protocol numbers
might be best represented if it’s bits be mapped from P0-P4 then P5-P8. So instead of
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checking the entire 8 bits’ fields from P0-P8, it is a good idea to check the first 4 bits
and then the rest of the bits later.

4.1.1 Policy Representation Phase
Choosing the right split size for the BDD generation is as same as choosing a right
variable ordering for a BDD, which is an NP-complete problem. But based on the
analysis, it is possible to decide the split size to be used for the BDD. For e.g. based
on the Protocol Distribution section, it is shown that high number of traffic were
related to the TCP protocol. The split size can then be changed easily by analyzing
the traffic characteristics but it can only be changed once during the BDD generation
phase.

For example, assume having a simple packet header that consist of only source and
destination fields each is just 4-bits long with all the rule’s decision is Allow. Table 4
shows the demo packet header converted into Binary equivalent. Assuming the split
size is set to 2. The Fig 6 shows how the Rule 1 will be represented.

Rule #
R1
R2
R3

Source
1011
1001
1010

Destination
1100
1110
1101

Table 4: A Sample Policy List
The left figure in Figure 6 shows the BDD representation of the firewall when the
split size is considered and the figure on the right in Figure 6 shows the BDD
representation of the firewall when the split size is not considered.
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Figure 6: BDD Representation

4.1.2 Packet Filtering Phase
In the BDD packet filtering phase the split size defines the number of bits that must
be checked by the packet filter before moving on to the next field in the firewall. So
instead of considering the entire field of the firewall as one contiguous block, it is
better to consider them as a non-contiguous block. For e.g. if a split size of 8 is
chosen then the bits of the fields will be represented as shown in Table 5.
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Proto
Field
(0,7)
Field bits
BDD variable 0,7
Destination
Port
(0,7)
32,39
Destination
Port
(8,16)
64, 71
Destination IP
(24, 32)
96, 103

Source IP
(0,7)
8,15

Destination IP
(0,7)
16, 23

Source IP
(8,16)
40, 47

Destination IP
(8,16)
48, 55

Source IP
(16,24)
72, 79

Destination IP
(16, 24)
80, 87

Source
Port
(0,7)
24, 31
Source
Port
(8,16)
56,63
Source IP
(24, 32)
88, 95

Table 5: Variable Ordering
4.2 Field Ordering

Majority of the packet filtering devices like firewalls do not give specific
consideration for optimizing packet rejection. If a packet does not match any of the
rules in the policy, then it is discarded because the default rule (last rule) is assumed
to be deny (Hamed, Discovery of policy anomalies in distributed firewalls, 2004). It
is highly crucial for any firewall to implement a successful packet filtering.
However, most of the packet filtering research done by authors focuses on exploiting
the characteristics of filtering rules and ignores to consider the traffic behavior as
another factor for optimization (Al-Shaer, 2006) schemes.

Optimization of the firewall packet filtering can be done at various stages during
packet filtering process. Since, our work focuses only on BDD, so only the
optimization technique related to BDD is discussed in this research. One of the most
important optimization technique is field order, field order plays a very important
role in the firewall. During network attacks such as DOS, the traffic is created in
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such a way, that packets will always get rejected by the bottom rules or the last field
of the bottom rules. If the fields are ordered in an optimal way, then the chance of
packets being rejected at early stage increases which will then improve the
performance of the firewall. But in a traditional firewall packet filter, the field order
is fixed, which causes the performance to degrade during such network attacks.

As the networking speed increases, it is very important for the firewall to improve its
packet filtering performance. Time is an important factor when considering the
performance of the packet filter. To improve the performance, it is much more
important to focus on the rejection packets of the firewall because if the rejection
packets are rejected by the deny-all rule then it can cause more harm to the
performance. Thus, it is more important to focus on early packet rejection.

There is an extensive amount of research work done on packet classification. The
basic approach is to search the rules sequentially till a match is found. This approach
is not time efficient because as the rule list increases the search time increases as
well. So the performance of the basic approach is proportional to the length of the
rule list in the firewall. Research on improving the search time for packet filtering
uses one or more of the following approach: hardware-based solutions, specialized
data structures, geometric algorithms, and heuristics (Al-Shaer, 2006).

Our study of the network traffic collected from (CADA, n.d.) shows that the major
portion of the traffic flows gets rejected at a field in the firewall rules. It is also
observed that this distribution is likely to stay for a time interval, if this distribution
property is considered then it is highly likely that it can improve the performance of
the packet filter. Therefore, a new method is proposed in this research, that uses the
field distribution as one of the factor to improve the performance of the packet filter.
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The proposed method called, Static Shuffling BDD [SSBDD] uses a typical Binary
Decision Diagram as its base. The tree is mainly focused to reject the traffic as early
as possible because a rejected packet might traverse long decision path of rule
matching before getting rejected by the default-to-deny rule in the firewall. As the
number of rejection packets increases the performance degrades as it causes
significant overhead on the firewall. The implementation of SSBDD does not require
any sort of special support from the firewall.

The SSBDD relies on field ordering for its optimization. Early rejection is possible in
firewall if the field order is chosen efficiently. But choosing an optimal field order is
an NP complete problem as the traffic is always random in nature. Predicting the
type of traffic is not possible but a few assumptions can be made for any traffic based
on the traffic characteristics.
4.2.1 Field Count Distribution
Another study conducted on the traffics to see the distribution of field counts. This
study provides much more detailed overview into at which bit or node level of the
field the packet got rejected. This data at first seems not useful but when collected
from time to time can provide an overview into which fields is more important and
can help to prioritize one field over other. It can also provide information to BDD,
whether the BDD should start reading the packet headers from MSB to LSB or the
other way around.

For e.g. given any network traffic that is received from the router to the firewall, it is
safe to assume that all the traffic reaching the firewall will belong to the network.
Since, the organization has LAN network, so they’ll be having Private Address
space. In that case, it is always best to start the search from MSB to LSB instead of
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LSB to MSB. So it is suggested that depending on the traffic specifications the less
important fields should be checked later in order to speed up the performance of the
packet filter.
4.2.2 Rule Reordering vs Field Reordering
Rule reordering is the most focused area in the field of packet filtering. There has
been various research work done on it. Based on the analysis shown above in Rule
hit distribution, it is visible that reordering of the rule can have an impact on the
packet filtering performance. But the success of rule reordering is mainly dependent
on the how interconnected the rules are in the firewall rule list. If the majority of the
rules are dependent, then rule reordering will not improve the firewall performance.

On the other hand, field reordering seems like a good alternate solution. The main
advantage of field reordering, it is not affected by the rule dependency. Because the
field ordering happens at the search time. If given enough information about the
traffic log, then an optimal field reordering can be achieved which can improve the
performance of the firewall overall.
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Chapter 5: Implementation
In this chapter we will discuss about the implementation part of our proposed
method. The implementation is applied once during the packet generation phase and
then during the packet filtering phase, both of them are explained in detail. At last we
check out the lookup comparison between the two of them.
5.1 Policy Representation using SSBDD
To generate an SSBDD for a given set of firewall rules, it has to go through 4 stages
which starts from the taking the rule set as an input and onto the final stage that
converts the rules into the final SSBDD. The chart below gives you the overview of
what happens at each and every stage of the SSBDD generation.

Input the
Firewall
Rules

Rules to
Binary
format

Binary to
Formula
format

SSBDD
generation

The final SSBDD which is generated is in a graphical format i.e. DOT format, the
DOT format is only the user but the generation of the DOT format file is disabled as
it increases the CPU processing time. The another format which is generated is a
tuple set for each node in the BDD, this format is used for the parsing.
5.1.1 Input the Firewall Rules
The input file used by the program which contains the rule set or the traffic is in CSV
format. The packets were collected from CAIDA. The metadata contains more
information than it is needed so only the necessary information is collected from the
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file; source ip, source port, destination ip, destination port, and protocol. The format
of the file for both the traffic and the firewall rule set is given below.
<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstport,
icmp.type,icmp.code>
with open(ruleFile, "rb") as csvfile:
pkt_reader = csv.reader(csvfile)
del dyn_order_var[:] # Resetting the dyn_order_var now ...
read_config_file()
for pkts in pkt_reader:
newPkt = {}
for order in ruleConf.order:
if order == 'p':
newPkt['p'] = pkts[field_pos['p']]
elif order == 's_ip':
newPkt['s_ip'] = pkts[field_pos['s_ip']]
elif order == 's_p':
newPkt['s_p'] = pkts[field_pos['s_p']]
elif order == 'd_ip':
newPkt['d_ip'] = pkts[field_pos['d_ip']]
elif order == 'd_p':
newPkt['d_p'] = pkts[field_pos['d_p']]

ruleListBin.append(dyn_ruleFormula(ruleToBin(newPkt)))

The above is the algorithm for reading the rules from the CSV file is given below.
The file is opened in a reading mode and the code goes through the file line-by-line
as each line contains one firewall rule in it. For every firewall rule that is read from
the file is converted into first binary equivalent and then it is converted into the
formula format. Once the above code is executed, the code will have the entire rule
set converted into the formula format which is then written to the CSV file.
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5.1.2 Rule to Binary Format
In order for the BDD to be generated the values must be in binary format, so it is
necessary to convert each and every rule or packet header into the equivalent binary
format. The discussion on Binary conversion is also discussed in more detail in the
Chapter BDD. This step is basically a conversion of the decimal values to the binary
format. The algorithm for the binary conversion is shown below.

def ruleToBin(pktRule):
"""
Takes the entire rule and then
convert the rule into a binary
format given below
[src-ip] = 00011100
"""
ruleBin = {}
for key, value in pktRule.iteritems():
if int(key == "s_ip") | int(key == "d_ip"):
tmp = value.split('.')
ruleBin[key] = ""
for x in tmp:
ruleBin[key] += padding(((bin(int(x))).replace('b','')), 8)
elif int(key == "s_p") | int(key == "d_p"):
if len(value) > 0:
ruleBin[key] = (padding(((bin(int(value))).replace('b','')),16))
else:
print "\tEither the Source or Destination Port is not given, skipping
this rule ..."
return False
elif key == "p":
if (value.isdigit()):
ruleBin[key] = padding(((bin(int(value))).replace('b','')[::-1]),8)
else:
ruleBin[key] = padding(((bin(protocol[value])).replace('b','')[::-1]),8)
return ruleBin
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A. Binary to Formula Format
This is an important stage in the SSBDD generation process, once the rules are
converted into its binary equivalent the next stage is to convert the rule into a
formula format. The formula format shows what does each and every node in the
BDD contains. Below is the algorithm that shows how the binary equivalent rules
are converted into the formula format.

def dyn_ruleFormula(ruleBin):
# Convert the Binary rule format into a formula
s_ip_len = 33
d_ip_len = 33
s_p_len = 17
d_p_len = 17
p_len = 9
s_ip_tracker = 1
d_ip_tracker = 1
s_p_tracker = 1
d_p_tracker = 1
p_tracker = 1
tmp_s_ip = {}
tmp_d_ip = {}
tmp_s_p = {}
tmp_d_p = {}
tmp_p = {}
for j in ruleBin['s_ip']:
if s_ip_len != s_ip_tracker:
tmp_s_ip['s_ip'+str(s_ip_tracker)] = j
s_ip_tracker += 1
for k in ruleBin['d_ip']:
if d_ip_len != d_ip_tracker:
tmp_d_ip['d_ip'+str(d_ip_tracker)] = k
d_ip_tracker += 1
……

30

for m in ruleBin['d_p']:
if d_p_len != d_p_tracker:
tmp_d_p['d_p'+str(d_p_tracker)] = m
d_p_tracker += 1
for n in ruleBin['p']:
if p_len != p_tracker:
tmp_p['p'+str(p_tracker)] = n
p_tracker += 1
s_ip_tracker = 1
d_ip_tracker = 1
s_p_tracker = 1
d_p_tracker = 1
p_tracker = 1
ruleFormula = collections.OrderedDict()
for tmp in dyn_order_var:
tmp_field = tmp['og']
if tmp['field_name'] == 's_ip':
ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_s_ip[tmp_field]
elif tmp['field_name'] == 'd_ip':
ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_d_ip[tmp_field]
elif tmp['field_name'] == 's_p':
ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_s_p[tmp_field]
elif tmp['field_name'] == 'd_p':
ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_d_p[tmp_field]
elif tmp['field_name'] == 'p':
ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_p[tmp_field]
return ruleFormula

5.1.3 SSBDD Generation
The final phase of the SSBDD generation is simple writing the formula generated
above into a formula file. This formula file is then used to generate the graphical
BDD, which is disabled in this stage as it increases the CPU processing time. Below
is an example f what exactly does the formula file contains.
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Let p = Protocol = TCP
= (p1 & p2 & p3 & p4 & p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p8)

The above example shows how the binary equivalent of the TCP protocol will be
written in the formula file in the end.
5.2 SSBDD Packet Filtering
Packet filtering is the next stage of SSBDD, at this stage the packet is received by the
packet filter which is then used to traverse the SSBDD to determine whether or not
to accept or reject the packet. The step-by-step flow diagram is given below; it is
same as the one described in the SSBDD generation phase. The only difference is in
the last stage, instead of generating the BDD it will traverse the BDD. The final stage
is merely a comparison stage where each node value is compared to see if it matches
or not. The earlier stages of the SSBDD Packet Filter has been explained before.

Input the
Firewall
Rules

Rules to
Binary
format

Binary to
Formula
format

Find
matching
rule

Below is the implementation of SSBDD traversal that traverses the SSBDD tree once
it receives a packet.
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def pktMatcher(pktBin, ruleBDD):
global nextNode
global matchHit
global tmpRuleBDD
tmpRuleBDD = ruleBDD
tmp_h_table = {}
for data in ruleBDD['h_table'].items():
tmp_h_table[data[1]] = data[0]
for pktData in pktBin.items():
if str(nextNode) == "1":
log_data = "\tPacket has been accepted now ... and the hit count is
"+str(matchHit) + "\n"
writeLog(log_data)
matchHit = 0
return
elif str(nextNode) != "-1":
if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]:
if str(pktData[1]) == "0":
indice = int(pktData[1])+1
elif str(pktData[1]) == "1":
indice = 2
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]):
return
else:
nextNode = nextNode - 1
while True:
if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]:
break;
else:
nextNode = nextNode - 1
if str(pktData[1]) == "0":
indice = int(pktData[1])+1
elif str(pktData[1]) == "1":
indice = 2
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]):
return

33
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]):
return
elif str(nextNode) == "-1":
nextNode = len(tmp_h_table)+1
if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]:
if str(pktData[1]) == "0":
indice = int(pktData[1])+1
elif str(pktData[1]) == "1":
indice = 2
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]):
return
else:
nextNode = nextNode - 1
while True:
if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]:
break;
else:
nextNode = nextNode - 1
if str(pktData[1]) == "0":
indice = int(pktData[1])+1
elif str(pktData[1]) == "1":
indice = 2
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]):
return

5.3 BDD Packet Filter vs SSBDD Packet Filter
The explanation of SSBDD generation and traversal is done in the previous section
in detail. To see the practical approach of SSBDD, a single rule is provided to both
the BDD’s – BDD packet filter and SSBDD packet filter. This provides a clear
overview of how the packet filter works at the filtering level. Since the BDD requires
the rule to be converted into binary format so the binary equivalent of the rule is
written instead of it’s decimal format. The Table 6 contains the Binary equivalent of
the rule.
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Protocol

0000 0110

Source IP

11000000 10101000 00100001 11110111

Destination IP

11000000 10101000 00100000 01111101

Source Port

00000100 00011010

Destination Port

00001101 00111101

Table 6: Binary equivalent of a rule
5.3.1 BDD Packet Filter
In a regular BDD packet filter, the traversal is done by going from one field to the
another field like a regular firewall. Below is a single packet converted into its binary
equivalent. Once converted it starts from the first field and takes the entire field and
starts the traversal. In a regular BDD packet filter, the field order is fixed so they
cannot be changed. This is the limitation of this BDD because several traffic can be
rejected earlier or may be some bits are not needed to be checked in order to get the
decision.

Figure 7: BDD Packet Filter
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5.3.2 SSBDD Packet Filter
In SSBDD filter since the field order can be changed based on the traffic analysis
which shows what fields are more important than the other. Another important factor
which was discussed in detail in Chapter Split Size, deciding how many bits to check
from each field before moving on to the another field.
Since at the beginning there’s no traffic log to analyze so SSBDD will go with a
default option of setting the property to the following values
<field order = protocol, source ip, destination ip, source port, destination port>
<split size = 8>

Figure 8: SSBDD Packet Filter
In Figure 8 it is visible that instead of checking the entire field at a time, SSBDD
takes 8 bits from each field and then goes to another field. The advantage here over
the BDD packet filter is the necessary bits are not checked at the first stage instead
they are delayed for the next stage. This gives a performance improvement to
SSBDD which can be very useful when there’s a high amount of rejection traffic.
An interesting question about the BDD approach is with regard to how robust the
BDDs are to the access list rule structure. Techniques such as RFC, cross-production
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and the tuple space search rely heavily on structured access lists for good
performance – some even become unusable in extreme conditions. This question is
tackled in Chapter 6 once the experimental evidence has been presented.
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Chapter 6: Analytical Discussion of the SSBDD
The previous chapter provides a framework for the construction of SSBDD,
representations of access lists and using them to perform lookup in packet filters.
This chapter presents an analytical discussion into SSBDD approach to packet
filtering. The main reason behind this chapter is to discuss the computing aspects of
the SSBDD packet filter and get an overview of the lookup time.
The discussion begins into what SSBDD representations of access lists look like and
what determines the structure of these SSBDDs, since the shape and size of a
SSBDD directly affects its time and space performance. Then the discussion goes
into the bounds for, as well as factors affecting, the lookup time of the BDD packet
filter, while the next section discusses factors affecting memory usage.

6.1 SSBDD Representation of Access List
The SSBDD representation of an access list is a regular BDD and it describes at a
lowest level of what packets are accepted or rejected by the packet filter. SSBDD
contains two nodes 1 or 0 which are the terminal nodes, where 1 means the packet is
Accepted and 0 means the packet is Rejected. Every node in the SSBDD refers to a
particular bit in the packet header. Reaching to the terminal node 0 – rejection node –
has more than one path and the same applies to the acceptance traffic as well, so
these complete set of paths for rejection and acceptance is the entire search space of
the SSBDD.
To understand the concept of the access list in SSBDD let’s consider a demo access
list shown below in Table 7. This list accepts only TCP and UDP type traffic and
from the certain IP address as mentioned in the access list itself. Although this is a
somewhat an unlikely access list in a real world scenario, it does share some
properties with real access lists which is important to understand the sections to be
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discussed ahead. This access list is going to be used in the rest of this chapter to
explain the sections ahead.

Rule
#

Source Addr

Destination Addr

Source
Port

Destination Protocol
Port

1
2
3

192.168.1.10
172.16.2.12
192.168.3.10

10.23.12.43.2
80.75.45.3.12
98.3.12.5

9000
10234
8769

80
80
878

TCP
TCP
UDP

Table 7: Sample Access List
There are many factors that can affect the structure of the SSBDD, not all the factors
can be controlled but there are few factors which can be controlled. Those factors
were discussed in detailed in the Chapter Packet filter optimization and Chapter Split
size. Field ordering is one factor that can improve the performance of the firewall’s
packet filtering. If the field order is chosen correctly, then it can improve the
performance of the packet filter. In a regular BDD based packet filter the field order
is fixed and cannot be changed so the factor of field ordering is not considered. The
shape and size of a BDD representing an access list are affected by various factors
such as the number of nodes, number of variables and BDD depth, which in turn
affects the performance of the SSBDD packet filter.
Of the factors affecting the structure of the BDD, some can be controlled and others
cannot. The two main factors involved are the access list itself and the variable
ordering of the BDD. The variable ordering of the BDD can be manipulated to
improve the performance of the packet filter, whereas the access list is generally
fixed. Variable orderings can also often be chosen to take advantage of the rule
structure in the access list. The next two sections discuss how these factors affect the
structure of the BDD.
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6.1.1 The Effect of Rule Structure
SSBDD consist of number of variables and these variables are reference to the
packet header bits of the access list. This illustrates two points. Firstly, during the
SSBDD construction the variables that are not needed are automatically excluded in
the construction process. This optimization is very useful as it can affect the
performance of the SSBDD overall. Second point, the number of variable in SSBDD
is completely dependent on the complexity of the access list. The more specific the
rule is the more variables an SSBDD will need.
Common values in the field is also another factor that can affect the SSBDD of the
access list. Rule that share common values with another rule can often help the
SSBDD to generate less variable. For example, Rule # 1 and Rule # 2 shares the
same destination port i.e. 80, so during the SSBDD generation time both the rule will
share the variables but will have different exit points. This aggregation of similar
values greatly affects the size of the BDD, since the degree to which expression in
the BDD can be shared determines the number of nodes required for the BDD. In a
simple statement, the more data the rules share the less variables the SSBDD will
need.

6.1.2 The Effect of Variable Ordering
The variable ordering chosen for the example has the source address first followed
by the source port then destination address then destination port and then protocol at
the end. During the lookup the source address will always be checked first but what
if the packet that is coming is not a TCP or a UDP protocol. Even though if the
addresses the packet will still have to go through the first field and then get rejected
at the end. If a different variable ordering is used – for example having the protocol
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field appearing as the first testing for every packet, then the packet filter may be able
to reject packets early. Since the protocol has the smallest field size so less number
of bits will be checked.
Changing the field ordering does not change the semantics of the SSBDD for any
given access list as they are semantically equivalent. The only change in the SSBDD
will be its structure. The number of nodes, the path lengths, and the order in which
the variables appear from root node will be different.
Different field ordering will have a different affect on the overall SSBDD structure.
It is very common to see that on ordering can reduce the path lengths or vice versa.
The memory usage of SSBDD is completely dependent on how long is the SSBDD.
The bigger the SSBDD the more memory it will take which will in turn take more
time to traverse the SSBDD. So it is safe to make this assumption that different
variable ordering creates different space-time tradeoffs.
6.2 Performing Lookup on a SSBDD
The SSBDD algorithm starts from the first node – root node, checks the value and
follows the appropriate edge of the node. This process will continue until the the
terminal nodes is reached. If the the terminal node is 0 then the packet is rejected or
accepted if the terminal node is 1. So, the time taken by the SSBDD to reach a
specific decision is equivalent to the length of the path traversal the SSBDD follows.
6.2.1 Worst Case Analysis
The worst case in SSBDD occurs only when the SSBDD traverses the longest path to
reach the terminal node. In other words, it can be assumed that, the worst case occurs
when the SSBDD traverses most of the nodes in the SSBDD.
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The upper bound of the SSBDD structure defines how many nodes the
SSBDD will traverse in its worst case scenario. Since the variable needed to
create the SSBDD is based on the rule structure so the worst case scenario of
the SSBDD will never exceed the maximum number of nodes used in the
SSBDD.



In the worst case scenario, the SSBDD is meant to traverse majority of the
nodes. But to represent any given rule in SSBDD it needs n variable. So the
SSBDD will never exceed more than n variable to reach a decision. The
lower bound of the SSBDD will always be either exactly the n variable
needed to represent the SSBDD or less than the n variable.

6.2.2 Best Case Analysis
The best case of the lookup algorithm depends on the variable ordering of the
SSBDD, so different SSBDD will lead into a different result. Best case in SSBDD
occurs only when the SSBDD choses the shortest path from the tree to reach a
terminal node. In majority of the SSBDD the best case can occur during the
matching of the protocol field since it requires maximum of 8 nodes.
It also worth noticing that the best case of SSBDD can also be reduced from 8 nodes
to 4 nodes comparison. For example, if taking the protocol field, it requires 8 bits to
represent in the SSBDD but the maximum number of protocol used in Internet traffic
is either TCP, UDP, or ICMP, which can be represented easily on SSBDD from the
first 4 bits. So the best case of the SSBDD can also be 4 nodes if the SSBDD
considers checking the first 4 bits first instead of checking all the 8 bits.
The best case scenario has little value because in real world it is unlikely to occur in
practice. If the firewall is receiving more accepted traffic, then the rejection traffic so
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the best case scenario will not occur as the best case scenario usually means the
packet is getting rejected.

6.3 Memory Usage of SSBDD
The memory usage of SSBDD is based on the number of nodes that are needed to
represent the access list. As shown in the Section 1 (a) and 1 (b) discusses the factors
that can affect the overall structure of the SSBDD. The same factors are discussed in
detail as a separate chapter – Split Size and Field Ordering.
In real world, the access list usually has lots of similarity between rules, this is due to
the fact that the firewall is filtering between multiple networks internally. So with
this assumption, it can be said, that the possibility of rules sharing nodes in SSBDD
is very high which in the end can reduce the overall count of the nodes in the
SSBDD. For example, if the source address in the Rule #1 and Rule #3 shares the
same first two bytes which means the nodes will be shared for the first byte in the
SSBDD. These little factors can greatly contribute to the structure of the access list
in the SSBDD.
Predicting the number of nodes that the SSBDD will take is not possible as it is
shown earlier that it can vary based on the field ordering. But having the knowledge
of the access list can help to understand the right field order for the SSBDD in order
to create a better and compact structure.
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Chapter 7: Architecture and Simulation
Experimental evaluation is the predominant technique used in this research for
evaluating the SSBDD packet filter and fulfilling the research objectives. Evaluation
is achieved by comparing the SSBDD packet filter to a packet filter that evaluates its
rules sequentially. Two sequential packet filters are used for comparison and details
regarding these are given later.
In order to achieve meaningful and generalizable results, it is important for the
experimental methodology to provide an experimental environment that is as realistic
as possible. This chapter is devoted to discussing how this is achieved, starting with
the overall experimental setup and then investigating its components separately.
First the implementation part of the system is discussed in detail with all of it’s
module involved in it. This is followed by an explanation of the simulation
environment, which discusses the technical specs of the system used to evaluate the
performance of both the BDDs. The next section discusses the Simulation Data that
is used by the system to evaluate the performance of the BDDs. At end the Timing
section will discuss how the performance is evaluated for the BDDs.
7.1 System Implementation
This section discusses the specifications of the packet filters in this research, as well
as some important factors affecting their design and implementation. It then presents
the implementations of the SSBDD and list-based or field-based packet filters.
7.1.1 Packet Filter Specification
The key requirement of the proposed packet filters used in this research is that they
be stateless, meaning that the decision of whether to accept or reject a packet is
based on each packet individually, independently from what happened in the past.
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This forces each filter to invoke its lookup algorithm for every packet. The proposed
packet filters are not required to handle fragmented packets since fragmentation can
be resolved with caching, which is not the part of the research focus.

Furthermore, each packet filter must allow filtering of IP packets on the following
fields:
o Source and destination address(es): Single IP addresses are accepted the current
research work does not support the use of masking in the IP address.
o Source and destination port numbers: Single numbers only are accepted.
o Protocol type: This refers to the transport protocol type. Accepted values are
TCP, and UDP

If any field is omitted from a rule, it is skipped from and the packet filter moves to
the next packet. For example, if the protocol field is ICMP then the packet is not
considered since there won’t be any source and destination port number given for it.
Finally, each packet filter must support the two actions PERMIT and DENY.

7.2 Coding and Modules
The programming language used to implement the SSBDD packet filter is Python.
The code to implement the regular Binary Decision Diagram is already implemented
in [1]. The SSBDD’s coding work is basically an extension to the Tyler’s [1] work.
The regular BDD implementation shown in [1] is based on the research work
conducted in [2].
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RunMe.py

Formula.py

MatchRule.py

Figure 9: Modules of SSBDD implementation

Figure 9 shows the name of the 3 important modules for the SSBDD implementation.
The above are not the only modules of the system, there are many more modules
used behind the system but explaining that is not necessary. The main working of
these implementation are as follows:

7.2.1 RunMe.py
This is the main module of SSBDD. The simulation starts by executing this file
which then calls the rest of the other files. In order, to execute the module there are
certain prerequisite that should be met.
The following are the pre-requisite that is needed to execute the module RunMe.py


The config.py file must be present, this file defines the two parameters
that were discussed in the earlier chapters – field ordering and split size.
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CSV file that contains all the rules needed for the given simulation. The
rules must be in CSV format and the structure of the rules should follow
the structure give below:

<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstp
ort,icmp.type,icmp.code>


CSV file that contains all the packets needed for the simulation. The
packets must be in CSV format again and also the structure must follow
the same structure as mentioned for the rule file.

This module at the end will provide the following outcome.


Calling the other necessary modules to generate the BDD and SSBDD.



Performing the packet filter.



Displaying the CPU Performance Time for both the BDDs.



Displaying the count of Accepted, Rejected, and Total Traffic received by
the packet filter.

7.2.2 Formula.py
In order to generate a BDD, the rules first must be converted into a Binary equivalent
and then the binary formatted rule is then converted into a Boolean expression or a
formula. All that conversion process is taken care by this module.
This module is not called independently, instead it is called by the RunMe.py
module, and it only asks for a file name that has the rules in it. The following are the
task that this module will perform in order to generate a single binary expression or a
formula which is then written into a file.
o Reading the CSV rule file line-by-line.
o Converting the rule into a binary format.
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o Converting the binary formatted rule into a formula or boolean expression.
o Writing the generated formula into a file.

Once this module is executed, the program will generate a single binary expression
for the entire rule set given to it. And also, if the user asks, a graphical BDD and
SSBDD. The option of generating the graphical BDD and SSBDD is usually
disabled as it consumes lot of CPU Processing Time which is not necessary.

7.2.3 MatchRule.py
This is the final module and it is called when the BDD and SSBDD have been
generated for the provided rule set. It is not executed independently; it is called by
the RunMe.py module. The following are the pre-requisite of this module: 

Needs the reference to the generated BDD and SSBDD for the given rule set.



CSV file that contains all the packets needed for the simulation. The packets
must be in CSV format again and also the structure must follow the same
structure as mentioned for the rule file.

The outcome of this module is to go through each packet one at a time and then
perform a matching by traversing the BDD. At the end, the result of accepted and
rejected traffic is given to the main module.
7.3 Other coding modules
The above were the only coding modules that were implemented from the scratch.
There are other modules too that are called in the background in to generate the BDD
and SSBDD. The packet filtering or traversing BDD and SSBDD module is a part of
MatchRule.py which is explained in the previous section.
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PBL
[Python
Boolean
algebra
Library]

PLY
[Python
binding to Lex
and Yacc]

Figure 10: Other Coding Modules.
The above are the rest of the two modules which are implemented by Tyler’s, the
code is open-source and it can be downloaded from (Tyler). The two modules are
dependent on each other and with these two modules none of the above modules
would run.
7.4 Simulation Environment
In order to simulate real packet filtering scenarios, an Amazon Web Server was used
to run the system. Running the system on a regular machine takes days to execute
even with a lowest traffic volume. The simulation environment uses just one server
and the same server traverses the rules file first and converts it into a BDD and
SSBDD. Then the packet file is read and it is passed against the rule.

To evaluate the performance of the system, CPU Processing Time is considered and
it is started right when the rule is read by the system and stops when all the packets
have been parsed by it. The specification of the server on the AWS are as follows: -
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Processor Type
Processor Speed
CPU Count
RAM
Hard Disk Drive

Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 (Haswell processor)
2.9 GHz
2
3.75 GiB
40 GB SSD
Table 8: Specification

7.5 Simulation Dataset
In this section we describe the data used in the experimental study. The data set used
in the experimental study is obtained from a CAIDA. The data provided by them
consist of around 17 million packet header information.

The demo of the packet header is shown below. Not all the data mentioned in the
dataset is used. For e.g. for the simulation purpose of our system only source ip,
destination ip, source port, destination port, and protocol field is used rest all the
other fields are skipped.
<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstport,
icmp.type,icmp.code>
7.6 Simulation Framework
The framework used for the simulation purpose act like any regular firewall and
requires a set of rules and packets to process. The dataset that is been used for the
evaluation purpose does not contain any firewall rules. So randomly packets were
chosen from dataset and were used as a firewall rule. By default, all the firewall
rule’s action property was set to Allow. Since the packets whose rule exist in the
firewall and whose Actions is either Allow or Deny will traverse the entire BDD. But
the main focus of this research work is for early packet rejections.
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The simulation performed on the system were different each time with a different set
of firewall rules, different amount of traffic, and mostly different set of acceptance vs
rejection ratio. Since, the research work is mostly focused on early rejection, so the
amount of traffic that were passed against the firewall rules had a high rejection
ratio.

Firewall
Rule

Traffic

Rejection
Ratio

Packet Filter
Figure 11: Simulation Framework Overview
Figure 11 gives an overview of what does the simulation framework contains. For
every simulation the three parameters as shown in the Figure 3 were changed. The
simulation was performed on both the BDD’s regular BDD and SSBDD.
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Chapter 8: Statistics
This chapter covers the result of the experimental evaluation of the SSBDD packet
filter. In the experimental evaluation, the efficacy of the SSBDD approach to packet
filtering is evaluated in terms of lookup. For the experiments performed, two sets of
data were collected – Linear BDD and Static Shuffling BDD. The CPU Timing
functionality was implemented by inserting the code to keep track of the overall
execution time.
In each and every experiment different set of Acceptance and Rejection Ratio were
used, to see the performance of the SSBDD during different rejection ratio. This
provides a better randomness in terms of simulation and at the same time will
provide a better result to verify the performance of BDD vs SSBDD. Each
experiment has 4 sets of simulation in them, where each simulation is run twice –
once on BDD and another one on SSBDD. The statistics that are shown in the graphs
below are based on the CPU timing.

8.1 Simulation Results
This section shows the performance of the various simulations that was performed on
the BDD based packet filter and SSBDD based packet filter. Each simulation has
been performed 4 times for BDD and SSBDD based packet filter, where each
simulation has varying sets of traffic passed to it with a varying set of firewall rules
for it.
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8.1.1 Experiment A
Acceptance Ratio = 10% & Rejection Ratio = 90%
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Figure 12: Experiment A Result
8.1.2 Experiment B
Acceptance Ratio = 5% & Rejection Ratio = 95%
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Figure 13: Experiment B Result
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8.1.3 Experiment C
Acceptance Ratio = 95% & Rejection Ratio = 5%
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Figure 14: Experiment C Result
8.1.4 Experiment D
Acceptance Ratio = 50% & Rejection Ratio = 50%
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8.1.5 Experiment E
Acceptance Ratio = 70% & Rejection Ratio = 30%
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Figure 16: Experiment E Result
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and Future Work
The contribution of this research was to find an efficient way to represent the access
filters of the packet filtering firewall. Packet filtering is the mechanism that is being
implemented in every hardware or software firewall. The issue with a traditional
packet filtering firewall, they perform rule matching sequentially. So, the latency
issued by this lookup process is equal to the size of the list.
The representation technique used in this research work is based on BDD. This
follows from the fact that BDDs is capable of providing a compact representation for
complex Boolean functions. The aim of this research was for two fold, in the first
fold, a new method was proposed to provide an efficient way to represent the access
list. The second fold was to evaluate the performance of the BDD in terms of their
lookup and also memory requirements.
9.1 Future Work
This section discusses the improvement areas of the SSBDD that can improve the
performance of it. These ideas, as well as others, are discussed in this section in
detail. Some ideas require more extensive research, while others are simple enough
to be implemented easily.
9.1.1 Variable Ordering and Reordering Prediction
Variable ordering is the major factor for performance improvement. Currently in this
research, SSBDD analyzes the access list to come up with a better variable ordering
at first, since there’s no traffic to analyze. Later on after several million packets the
SSBDD then uses the traffic characteristics to choose an optimal variable ordering.
Choosing good variable orderings for lookup is most effective when traffic is taken
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into consideration, so an algorithm that can continuously monitor the traffic and
update the variable ordering instead of checking after every several million packets
would maximize the potential of SSBDD packet filter.
9.1.2 Updating the SSBDD
Any change in the split size or variable ordering or in the access list requires the
SSBDD to be regenerated again. SSBDD regeneration is a time consuming process,
but if the SSBDD is able to update itself incrementally then it can save a lot of CPU
processing time and improve the performance overall.
9.1.3 Considering more Parameters for Performance
As the scope of the thesis, CPU time was considered as a performance factor. But
more factors can be considered, such as – memory utilization, CPU utilization etc.
CPU utilization can give a better overview of the proposed method, in terms of how
much load it is putting on the CPU.
9.2 Conclusion
The aim of this research was to propose a new method for the purpose of
representing the access list of the firewall. This aim was achieved in two ways.
Firstly, the proposed method SSBDD was discussed in detail. Secondly, the
simulation was performed to prove that SSBDD performs efficiently. The advantages
of this approach extend beyond performance as it helps to understand other problems
with traditional packet filter.
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